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KEYNOTE:
THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SOCIETY'
Lawrence Lessig*
LAWRENCE LESSIG: Copyright in the United States did not reach
beyond the United States until 1891. For the first hundred years in the
United States' history, we protected no foreign copyrights at all. We were,
in the modem parlance, born a pirate nation.
In the context of patents, we have always had a tradition that respects
the local reach of patent protection. That tradition has spoken importantly
about protecting in a local context and argued increasingly about extending
that local protection. But at this moment we are in a process of reforming
that tradition. We stated the objectives of this practice, to reach an ideal of
universal intellectual property protection. An ideal which is increasingly
expressed as an abstract right, which reaches everywhere universally,
which is to be enforced everywhere. This tradition now speaks of an
absolute principle that should reach around the world without selectivity
and without condition. I think this reforming of our tradition is a good
thing, generally. I think in particular that patents are a good thing,
generally. I think in particular that drug patents are a good thing, generally.
I believe without them, without a system of patent protection for drugs, we
would not begin to have the kind of investment and innovation and the
creation of new drugs. That a system of producing ways to solve problems
of disease depends upon this particular system of protection. And of all the
areas of patent protection perhaps this one more than any, deserves the
support of our tradition, generally.
But our problem is that this way of reforming a system of intellectual
property protection, has taken this idea of "generally," and restated it as an
absolute. This tradition that has taught us the importance of a balanced
system of protection, especially in the context of things like drug patents,
On March 15, 2003, the Stanford Law and Technology Association (SLATA) presented a
symposium on creating and protecting intellectual property in the international arena, or "Ideas
Without Boundaries." The following is an edited version of the keynote address and discussion.
More information about SLATA and its conferences can be found at http://slata.stanford.edu.
* Professor, Stanford Law School.
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has now been conceived of as an absolute right that should extend without
qualification everywhere. Now this expression of this new conception has
occurred most dramatically in the context of an agreement which otherwise
seems to be an agreement expressing a tradition of balance. We have
recently seen the adoption of the TRIPS [Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights]' Agreement around the world. An agreement
which attempts to assure the enforcement of intellectual property rights
around the world, through a general system of protection, with the
extraordinarily important exceptions built in for developing nations. These
exceptions, while still not as broad as some of us would have preferred,
express the fundamental ideal that our profession has always taught: that
intellectual property protections are to be balanced across the contexts in
which they get enforced, and in different contexts they need to be enforced
differently.
But though this ideal expresses itself within the TRIPS Agreement
we, the United States, have increasingly attempted to effectively change the
TRIPS Agreement. Not by explicit modification of the TRIPS Agreement,
but instead through a practice of bilateral negotiations which the United
States has engaged in with developing nations, where the United States
insists that developing nations impose upon themselves stronger
obligations than the TRIPS Agreement requires. We use the power of our
trading position to force developing nations to adopt what is effectively
"TRIPS plus" protection. A regime which increasingly, effectively, does
not express this tradition of balance, but instead expresses this tradition of
absolute protection. Instead of manifesting what we as a profession know,
that the reach of intellectual property protection needs to be conditioned
depending upon the context, it expresses this ideal. And thus this system of
balanced protection suffers. This tradition suffers. Because examples of its
extremism become so extreme that no one can continue to stare at the
system of intellectual property protection that we are defending and accept
it.
A theorist's place in this extremism, manifests itself in opposition, is
in the context of Africa, where thirty million people right now are infected
with a disease which could be, to some important extent, treated-but is
not. Where three million five hundred thousand people will die next year
from this disease. People who could have had their life extended in
treatments from drugs which will not be made available to them. Where
fifty-eight percent of the people infected with this disease are women. With
1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/27-trips.pdf.
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the ordinary mode by which this disease is spread is through heterosexual
sex. No drugs effectively deal with this disease in this place. Increasingly,
activists are getting people around the world to ask this question-why?
What could possibly justify a situation where millions of people who could
be saved are not being saved? Now the claim that is asserted against the
argument that these drugs should be made available to these people is a
claim increasingly framed in this rhetoric of theft. That to permit African
nations to take the knowledge necessary to combine ordinary chemicals
and turn them into a drug which could actually save human beings-to
permit that-would be to facilitate a kind of theft. It is stealing. It is
stealing the intellectual property which has been produced by drug
companies through their own investment of resources into the production
of knowledge about how to solve disease. This rhetoric frames the debate
as if what happens in Africa when African nations demand the right to
import these drugs free of patent protection, frames the debate to say what
they are demanding is the right to steal. And increasingly, activists are
getting people to recognize that this is an odd form of theft. Because unlike
taking millions of tons of wheat, which might be produced in the middle of
the United States, and shipping it to Africa to deal with the starvation, this
taking of knowledge actually physically removes nothing from any of us.
We lose nothing from the drug companies. It's an abstract taking, not a
physical taking. And because these nations are so poor anyway, it's not
even as if an opportunity cost is lost. It's not as if these nations could afford
to pay the money necessary to pay for these drugs. So it's not even as if
money is being taken from these people. So if no actual materials are being
removed and no potential profits are being removed, what is it that
motivates this extraordinarily strong desire to defend these intellectual
property protections we face? Fifteen to thirty million people will die when
drugs are not delivered in time.
Well, it's not my view the drug companies have no concern for this
problem. It's not my view that they're callous in their concern for people
dying in Africa. It's a much more invidious transaction that is going on to
slow the spread of these drugs into the nations that are necessary. My
judgment is that these companies would be completely happy to permit
these drugs to be exploited in these nations at zero marginal cost, at the
lowest possible price available. But they resist this because they recognize,
not so much the danger that these drugs will end up on errant markets, but
the danger that the fact that they make drugs available cheaply in African
nations will be used against them. When politicians from rich nations say to
them, "How is it that the drugs which you sell for fifty cents a pill in
Africa, you charge $1,000 a pill for it in the United States?" They're afraid
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that the politicians will turn against them and cling to the fact that they've
made drugs available at the economically rational price, practically zero,
and then force them to accept the same pricing structure within the rich
nation. So their behavior is not motivated by callousness. It's not motivated
by a lack of concern. Their behavior is motivated by the recognition that
we, the rich nations, will use the political process to force them into a
pricing structure which is fundamentally inconsistent with their ability to
support research in the context of innovation to solve these [problems].
This is a failure of a political process. And worse than the failure it reveals
about our political process, it's a failure that will increasingly weaken the
ability for intellectual property protections to be respected around the
world.
Now we, in this tradition of professionalism, have an obligation to
help this debate. We have an obligation to help people understand the
complexity of this debate. To teach these people who would pervert our
tradition, either by re-expressing the tradition in terms of an absolute, or by
forcing companies to adopt pricing structures which have no relationship to
the economic incentives that they need to produce. We need to teach those
two extremes the importance of the balance that has defined our tradition of
intellectual property exception, and that that tradition has always admitted
exceptions. That the "generally," which is mushy and hard to articulate, the
"generally" has admitted that there have been places where the reach of the
IP right has not been demanded. We need to teach this as our past and teach
people to embrace this ideal of exceptions. To help them understand how
these exceptions don't define a compromise of the principle of intellectual
property protection. These exceptions teach us where intellectual property
protection makes sense, and where it makes no sense. And if we could
teach this ideal of exceptionalism to the political process, then we could
recognize the opportunity again that we protect intellectual property
strongly in those places where it makes sense, and we except intellectual
property protection strongly where that protection is doing harm.
Twenty years from now, we will look back at the decisions we are
making today, when years from now we will know how many of these
thirty million people died because they didn't have drugs which we could
be providing at an extraordinarily low cost today. That number is certain to
be more than ten million. It could be more than twenty-five million.
Twenty years from now people will ask how we sat back while ten to
twenty-five million people died. In the name of what will they die? What
would stop us from allowing these elements of knowledge to spread around
the world freely so that people could build the technologies to save ten to
twenty-five million people? Twenty years from now it will seem
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extraordinary that a simple ideal about an abstract right, which if violated
takes nothing from us and costs nothing to people whose rights were
violated-it will seem extraordinary that that simple ideal stood in the way
of stopping the death of ten to twenty-five million people. Our children will
look at us and they will have no understanding of what we are allowing to
happen right now. They will have no comprehension of what we have
done.
We are lawyers who come from a tradition that teaches us something
different. That we have allowed our profession to allow this to happen is a
criticism that we need to take seriously. Our tradition teaches enough to
show the place where this exception should be allowed, and that place is
Africa. It teaches enough to show us that we should defend the rights of
drug companies to charge the money they charge in rich nations for the
drugs which they are producing. Our tradition teaches us this balance and
we have an obligation to stand outside of the interest of our clients and
teach the political process this same lesson.
(CLAPPING)
AUDIENCE: INAUDIBLE
MR. LESSIG: It's a hard question that I think leads people to the
absolute position. It's too hard to make the judgment of balance, so let's
just insist on the extreme. And the extreme is insisted on both sides. One
side of the extreme is "absolute protection everywhere," and the other side
of the extreme is "destroy patents." No patents anywhere. I don't have
much faith that we as a profession can teach this idea of balance and
judgment. So, I'm not sure I have an answer that is actually implementable,
but we need to try to say that we except places in the context of emergency.
We seemed to recognize it when it was a drug called Cipro 2 in the United
States. There was an emergency in the United States and immediately
everyone spoke about the need for a compulsory license for Cipro in the
United States.3 So, we recognize when it affects us. We need to recognize it
in other places, too, and combine the recognition of places where we need
an exception with the recognition that there are places that don't need an
exception. The United States needs no exception from the rules that govern
intellectual property with respect to drugs. If we believe in intellectual
property with respect to drugs, then we should allow the market to price it
2. "Cipro (ciprofloxacin hydrochloride) is an antibiotic used to treat bacterial infections in
many different parts of the body. Cipro is approved for the inhaled form of anthrax after an
individual has been exposed." See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research website at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cipro (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
3. See Kevin Anderson, "Cipro Demand Outstrips Supply," BBCNEWS (Oct. 25, 2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1618783.stm.
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as the market will price it in a competitive way.
AUDIENCE: Do you have an example of something that we did that
I can stop my binary thinking with?
MR. LESSIG: I think the example of saying that nations such as
India and Brazil should be permitted to produce these drugs and sell them
absent the patent protection that covers them-that India should be
permitted to create factories within Africa to produce these drugs, is
exactly the kind of exception that says there is someplace between the
middle. That is to say, we except, we remove, certain types of intellectual
property protection in the context of emergency, and admit that, while
embracing the ideal that we insist on that intellectual property protection in
the context where there isn't an emergency. Now, if we, as a political
culture have lost the ability to say we can tell the difference between an
emergency and a non-emergency, and so therefore, we need binaries all or
nothing, then my main point is, at a certain stage, reason will catch up with
that binary thinking. And when it does, what we have done will seem
extraordinary to those who look back at these decisions right now.
AUDIENCE: If some of the pressure on drug companies not to
reduce prices in other companies comes from what politicians in developed
or rich nations might say, is that an indictment of the members of those
countries that they don't have the empathy, or is it an indictment of our
culture in developed countries?
MR. LESSIG: It certainly is an indictment of the political system. So
the question was, is the fact that part of this problem is being caused by the
unwillingness of rich nations to recognize the necessity of price
discrimination in the provision of a monopoly product like a patented drug,
is that an indictment of the political system? And the answer is, yes. It is an
indictment of our political system. And I'm not even sure it's a failure of
the politicians to recognize this point, because I'm sure drug companies sit
down with them and say, you have to understand if you're going to
embrace a system of monopoly protection for drugs, then you have to
permit some kind of price discrimination here, and that means rich
countries have to pay more. I think they understand that. But the point is,
it's such a hard argument for other people generally to understand that it's
very easy for them to pretend like they don't get it. And drug companies, I
think quite reasonably, recognize that it would be very hard for them to
stand up and say, "we have to have the right to charge high prices in rich
countries so that lower prices can be charged in poor countries." But I think
what that means is that people, other than drug companies, need to stand up
and say exactly that. The people who are really interested in making sure
that drugs are available cheaply in developing nations need to defend the
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right of the drug companies to charge what the market bears outside of
those poor countries. That unless we, activists, who want to spread the
knowledge broadly, accept the consequence of the system we've embraced,
there will be a continued political pressure that will force the drug
companies to adopt exactly this strategy. So this is a criticism of the
political system. I think in part it's a criticism, too, of those of us who just
love the idea that everything could be free. Well, here's the world and
everything isn't free. Drugs are not free. Drugs cost an extraordinary
amount of money to produce. And someone's going to have to pay for that.
And the simple social justice point is-if anyone's going to pay for that, we
should. We should be paying for that. And the system we've embraced that
is basically forcing them to pay for this with their lives, will be seen as
extraordinarily outrageous at the time we have to defend it to our children.
AUDIENCE: INAUDIBLE.
MR. LESSIG: Let me summarize it like this. The question is, is the
same argument extended in the context of something like software? And,
would I differentiate software from the drug context? So, in one sense I
wouldn't. In one sense I think that companies like Microsoft also face
exactly this kind of problem. That if they had strong price discrimination
across countries, they would get extraordinary political pressure. But also
the pricing strategy of companies like Microsoft in a country like China is
very complicated. And of course, they oppose, and I think rightly oppose,
software piracy in China. But they recognize that if the whole world were
to give up software piracy and just start using operating systems which they
didn't have to pirate, like the Linux operating system, that would be a very
bad thing for them. So, in some sense, there is a certain amount of piracy
that is necessary to sustain the spread and reach of the Microsoft operating
system. So I guess in that sense I think there's a similarity to it. But the part
that I think is different is that, as all of us know when we attempt to get
people to pay attention to intellectual property issues, it's hard to get
anybody to care. The one place where they will begin really to care is in the
context of drug patents. And so what I'm suggesting is that, this is the one
place where we can get some real movement and gain an understanding
about how the system works generally. Because those of us, and I'm
counting myself in this class, there might be a small number of us but we
hope it gets to be larger. Those of us who fundamentally believe in the
system, but believe that the way the system is functioning right now is
deeply wrong, also believe that the way the system is functioning right now
will ultimately destroy the intellectual property system, generally. It will
seem outrageous and the consequence of that outrageousness will be an
extraordinary backlash against intellectual property protection, generally.
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And the harm that will follow from that is to drug companies first, and then
secondly to all of us since they won't have the money to invest to produce
new drugs. So it's at this place we both have to try to find a solution that
saves the biggest holocaust that you could imagine, saves fifteen million to
thirty million people, and at the same time, moves the debate so that the
consequence of saving fifteen million to thirty million people isn't
destruction of a system that I, at least at this moment, think is necessary to
create incentives to produce drugs.
AUDIENCE: It was suggested by one of the panelists this morning
that the most efficient and economic way to provide drugs would be to
eliminate patents and have government commissioned scientists to take
care of this. Do you think that's a viable alternative to the patent system?
And why not?
MR. LESSIG: I don't think it's viable right now. Even if I were
convinced of its viability, I think it's too radical a change right now. I think
what's necessary is a bit of murkinism right now. What is the change on the
margin that we can make to have the most impact on saving lives? The
change on the margin is not to eliminate the system completely. The
change on the margin is to adopt an exceptionalism that recognizes the
exception. I agree that there may be hard lines to draw. Certain cases will
be extremely difficult. But the fact that there'll be hard lines to draw does
not, should not, stop us from drawing what I think most people would think
to be an extremely easy one. Knowing nations that are being ravaged by
this disease should deserve the exception of saying that we will accept this
for a period of time for these nations to save these lives. And the
exceptionalism might actually help support decisions in other contexts
because at least you are saying, it's not that patents are being violated, it's
just that patents don't extend here. And patents not extending in different
material contexts has been a part of the patent system from its beginning.
AUDIENCE: Why not propose to each of the pharmaceutical
companies that for every quality of life drug for which you wish the full
protection to be absolute, you must put one life saving drug into the
exceptional regime, provided you either produce it yourself or you license
them through another company?
MR. LESSIG: I hadn't thought about that yet. It's a nice one though.
The problem, you know, I guess I should then just not say more, because I
haven't thought about that yet. But let me pretend like I had thought about
it. The problem with that is just to imagine that there's some structure in
the creation of drugs that would make that one-to-one tradeoff easy or
accessible. If I could be convinced of that, then that would be fine. But I
wouldn't wait until I was convinced of that to say the drug, in taking steps
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right now, to at least create exceptions, allow the exceptions to spread
without creating continued pressure on drug companies. Now, what's the
nature of that recognition for the exceptions that are necessary-you give
one, the deal you strike with pharmaceuticals. I'm going to be very precise
about where the problem is. We have in the United States a kind of special
interest politics where companies come to the trade representative and say,
we want you to use the United States' power to achieve the following
modifications of bilateral negotiations with the TRIPS agreement. Now
special interest politics is usually pretty harmless-who cares? It's the way
the government works in ninety-eight percent of what it does. But
sometimes the special interest politics is extraordinarily corrosive. It's
corrosive not just of the world standing of the United States but corrosive
of the very system it's trying to defend-intellectual property. What I've
been suggesting is that we need recognition of how corrosive this process is
to our moral standing in the world, and to the system of intellectual
property that many of us are devoted to, in some sense, protecting. Because
unless there is a recognition that this bilateral negotiation process corrupts
the basic balance that the system is to be pursuing, then there will be no
political pressure to stop. Unless people begin to say, this has to be
stopped, then the corrosion and the weakening of the intellectual property
system that I'm describing will take place.
AUDIENCE: Do the officers of the drug companies have a legal
obligation to profit?
MR. LESSIG: I completely agree with the first part of what you're
saying. You've got to recognize that the companies do what they do
because they're under an obligation to make money. So what I was trying
to suggest is the reason I think that they're not making this available
cheaply is because they think they'll make less money. But they won't
make less money because they're in a sense giving drugs away, they are
worried that they'll make less money because they'll be forced to charge
less for the drugs that they're able to charge for in the rich nations. So it's a
complicated reason why they would make less money. So my response to
that is, let's find a way to make it so that they won't make less money.
Well, what is the way to make it so they won't make less money? To raise
awareness about how wrong it is to insist that drug companies lower their
prices in the rich nations in response to the fact that they are offering drugs
cheaply in developing nations-like that argument has a moral
consequence. The argument to say that the fact that you're charging a
dollar a pill in Africa means you shouldn't be charging as much as you're
charging in the United States, that argument has the consequence of leading
drug companies to avoid lowering costs to the poor countries around the
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world. So there's a moral status variable that I think we should recognize
and then criticize. Now, it's not that they could do it on their own. In
particular, I think drug companies are the last people in the world who
should stand up and make the argument that I'm making. But the people
who need to stand up and make the argument that I'm making are the
people who are traditionally thought of as antagonistic to intellectual
property, like me. People like me need to stand up and say, there's an
important value protected by this intellectual property. It's necessary, and
we can't erode it by allowing our desire to have cheap drugs lead to
developing nations having no drugs. So it's part of our responsibility as
much as it is the drug companies. We don't have an obligation by law to
make money, and I can say that we failed if we do, so we should just admit
it, and get on with making the correct arguments.
AUDIENCE: But in reality there are virtually no patents on AIDS
drugs in sub-Saharan Africa, so patents really don't stop like you are
suggesting. Indian manufacturers, for example, the manufacturing facility
in Mozambique or India or wherever you want. I mean there are some
patents in South Africa-you know, the Harvard study shows that there are
no-virtually no patents on the retrovirals. So the problem is in my view
somewhere else. The problem is in the lack of infrastructure, the need to
have an infrastructure and also the health care budgets in these countries
are, you know, like ten dollars per patient a year.
MR. LESSIG: Yeah, sure. And the GDP is one dollar a person. So,
you're right. And so, let's be clear about where the source of the problem
is. I'm not saying the fact that there are patents in Mozambique means that
people are unable to get drugs there. But I am saying that the enforcement
of the patent system directly or indirectly is making it impossible for
Mozambique to afford drugs that are made elsewhere, and made without
patent protection, to be imported into Mozambique. This is the pattern of
protection that is done both directly, through law, and indirectly through
political pressure. So, until Jamie Love' S4 organization succeeded in
stopping the United States' pressure on South Africa, the United States was
pressuring South Africa into not excepting noncompliant drugs in a
context. Now the other part of this that is extremely important to emphasize
is that I'm not saying that the drugs would be even curable. Obviously they
won't. These drugs, in particular, need to be administered in a very regular
regime, and there is deep concern among health activists that there isn't
enough of an infrastructure to support the regular consumption of the drugs

4. See Daryl Lindsey, "The AIDS-Drug Warrior," SALON.COM (June 18, 2001), at
http://dir.salon.com/news/feature/2001/06/18/love/index.html.
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necessary for them to have an effect. That is absolutely right. And so
there's got to be lots of support for these other things, too. But the point
is-here's one change that requires no massive expense to affect that
change. The one change that can be achieved almost overnight would be a
liberalization of the incentives to move drugs into this area of Africa.
AUDIENCE: To ask a more constructive question, what would you
think about the consortium that is free from the antitrust laws combining
basically pharmaceutical companies wherever they are, in India and in the
United States just to target, to supply, you know, drugs at the cheapest
possible price to these countries?
MR. LESSIG: Well, I'd like to see the details but I like the general
idea. That's a simple way to get around the problem of incentives to get
them to produce and distribute drugs.
AUDIENCE: Because one of the issues in the retrovirals is that many
manufacturers, it's not one company supplying all the drugs.
MR. LESSIG: Right. But what is necessary for that to happen is a
recognition that we create a special exception in this context. It can push
that debate in light of the extraordinary pressure that will be put on the
intellectual property system generally if we don't succeed, then I think that
will be exactly the right solution. Thank you very much for letting me
speak.

